Why do far-right parties perform strongly in regions with very different migrant populations?
Electoral data from Saxony-Anhalt and El Ejido show that far-right support can rise under opposite demographic conditions. In Saxony-Anhalt the AfD captured 43.8 % of the vote and 39 of 83 seats, while the long-governing Christian Democratic Union fell to 17.2 %. Foreign residents account for only 8 % of the state population. In El Ejido, part of Almería province, foreign residents make up 32 % of roughly 90 600 inhabitants, most of them Moroccan agricultural workers. Vox nevertheless won 31.4 % locally, more than double its regional share of 13.8 %. The two settings therefore combine low and high migrant presence with comparable far-right outcomes. The Greek researcher Ioanna Dimopoulou, writing in Social Europe, uses these contrasting figures to demonstrate that the traditional explanation linking migrant numbers directly to xenophobic mobilisation does not hold. Instead the data point to a flexible political strategy that weaponises whatever local discontent is available. The analysis underscores that the number of migrants present is not the decisive driver; the decisive driver is the readiness of an extreme actor to frame existing complaints around a convenient target. The observation that deliberately sowing fear in society yields steadier electoral returns than presenting factual data and substantive solutions is confirmed across the current European political landscape.
How do local grievances differ yet produce the same political target?
In Saxony-Anhalt the dominant complaint centres on perceived abandonment, population decline and economic stagnation. Voters express a sense that central government has neglected the region. In El Ejido the main tensions involve direct labour-market competition and housing pressure linked to the greenhouse agriculture sector. Despite these distinct sources of dissatisfaction, both electorates converged on the same political conclusion: an external or internal group is presented as the primary cause. The choice of target is supplied by the political offer rather than derived organically from the underlying problem. Dimopoulou notes that sowing fear deliberately yields steadier electoral gains than presenting factual data and substantive solutions, a pattern confirmed across the current European political landscape. The source leaves open how long such constructed targets can sustain support once the immediate local trigger loses salience, yet the immediate record shows the strategy delivering strong results in both environments. The same mechanism operates whether the grievance is framed as distant neglect or immediate workplace rivalry; the political product simply supplies the enemy that converts discontent into votes.
Evidence from Catalonia on the flexibility of the “internal enemy”
Catalonia illustrates that nativist framing does not require a fixed national definition. Vox promotes Spanish centralism while Aliança Catalana advocates full Catalan independence. The two parties nevertheless share the core claim that a closed group of natives faces an external threat. Vote-flow analysis shows Aliança Catalana drew 28 % of its support from the traditional Catalan nationalist party Junts and 23 % from Vox itself. This transfer demonstrates that the nativist product can operate under contradictory national projects as long as the structure of insiders versus outsiders remains intact. The two radical-right forces entered the Catalan parliament in 2021 and 2024 respectively and compete on incompatible visions of the nation, yet they mobilise the same nativist core. The source shows that the political offer travels across opposing national projects provided the insider-outsider binary is preserved. Even when two far-right forces directly cancel each other on the defining national question of the last fifteen years, they continue to draw from the same reservoir of voters by maintaining the closed-native versus external-enemy template.
Why have mainstream efforts to reduce migration flows not reduced far-right support?
Since 2015 many centre-right and centre-left parties have tightened asylum and border rules in the expectation that lower inflows would shrink the far-right vote. The assumption was that migration numbers constitute the objective driver of discontent. Results in the two cases examined here contradict that assumption. Where systemic parties adopt the far-right diagnosis that migration is the central problem, they lend institutional weight to the same framing without diminishing the challenger’s appeal. The decisive variable therefore shifts from the quantity of migrants present to the set of unresolved local issues—housing, employment, public services—and the speed with which an extreme actor frames those issues around a convenient scapegoat. Dimopoulou concludes that the real question ahead of future regional votes is which unsolved local problems an extreme actor reaches first. The source indicates that the strategy of copying the far-right premise has so far reinforced rather than weakened the challenger. The pattern holds that when mainstream actors validate the chosen culprit, they stabilise the very narrative they intend to neutralise.
Frequently asked questions
What share of the vote did the AfD receive in Saxony-Anhalt?
The AfD obtained 43.8 % of the vote, securing 39 of the 83 seats in the state parliament.
What is the foreign-resident share in El Ejido?
Foreign residents constitute 32 % of the town’s approximately 90 600 inhabitants, with nearly two-thirds originating from Morocco.
Did lower migrant numbers reduce far-right support in Saxony-Anhalt?
No. The AfD achieved its highest state-level result in a region where foreign residents represent only 8 % of the population.
Can nativist parties compete under opposing national definitions?
Yes. In Catalonia, Vox and Aliança Catalana advance incompatible visions of the nation yet both mobilise on a nativist platform, drawing voters from each other and from mainstream nationalist parties.
Have stricter migration policies lowered far-right polling?
Available evidence indicates the opposite outcome. When mainstream parties adopt the premise that migration is the root cause, they reinforce rather than weaken the far-right narrative.
